

**STRATEGY  
RESEARCH  
PROJECT**

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**CONTRACT MANAGEMENT STRATEGY  
FOR THE 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY**

**BY**

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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## **ABSTRACT**

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This study examines the current roles and missions of the Defense Contract Management Agency in providing Contingency Contract Administration Services (CCAS) for contractors on the battlefield. This study reviews the historical use of contingency contracting and identifies strategic issues associated with the current process for supporting deployments. This study specifically focuses on the effectiveness of CCAS operations in the Balkans and identifies areas for improving future support to the warfighter. This analysis promulgates the need to develop joint doctrine relative to planning contractor support in the theater and provides a strategic vision for expanding contract management services for the warfighting Commander-In-Chiefs (CINCs).



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## CONTRACT MANAGEMENT STRATEGY FOR THE 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY

In all countries engaged in war, experience has sooner or later pointed out that contracts with private men of substance and understanding are necessary for the subsistence, covering, clothing, and moving of any army.

Robert Morris, Superintendent of Finance 1781

### **GENERAL**

Contractors have been used as early as the Revolutionary War to support requirements of the Army's fighting forces. Throughout both world wars, the Vietnam Conflict, Operation Desert Storm, and Operation Joint Forge, contractor support has proven to be an indispensable resource to "bridge gaps"<sup>1</sup> in the deployed force structure. President Johnson's decision not to activate the reserve forces led to a critical shortage of base support personnel in the Vietnam conflict.

"All told, the summer and fall of 1965 were dreadful months of sheer bedlam for construction planners and operators... There were neither equipment nor men enough to do the work as fast as it was needed... Combat troops helped with the unloading and lent a hand anywhere else they could. Engineers shuttled back and forth in a fire brigade role... President Johnson adamantly refused to call up reserves...so RMK filled the breach."<sup>2</sup> (Raymond-Morrison-Knudsen, a civilian construction firm).

The Army capitalized on the lessons learned from Vietnam and developed doctrine regarding the use of civilian contractors for combat support, eventually publishing Army Regulation 700-137, Logistics Civil Augmentation Programs (LOGCAP), in 1985. This institutionalized the concept known as LOGCAP with proponency under the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG). The LOGCAP focus went beyond a single contractor performing all the requirements and comprised all contracts awarded by all commands providing theater support for contingencies. In 1992, a restructured one-year cost-plus-award-fee contract valued at \$3.9 million with four renewal options was competitively awarded to the Brown and Root Services Corporation (BRSC) by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE). The Army's goal was to provide comprehensive support through an Indefinite Delivery Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) type of contract which could focus on various requirements. The most significant product to be delivered from the LOGCAP contract was "the technical requirements for the formulation of a logistical management plan to support a 20,000 man expeditionary force in fifteen (15) candidate nations as well as actual camp construction/operation option(s) described to a level of detail that makes fully clear the nature and content of the investigation and execution effort(s)." <sup>3</sup> The strategy was to "obtain civilian contractual planning assistance in peacetime in order to meet U.S. contingency support requirements worldwide. This was done through advance identification and planned acquisition of construction and logistical services by global corporate assets of a fully responsible and capable American firm."<sup>4</sup> The LOGCAP contractor was expected to be totally self-sufficient in formulating acceptable management plans and executing the support options they devised.

The LOGCAP contract provided for support in five broad categories: facilities, supplies, services, maintenance, and transportation. Specifically, the scope of the contract covered basic life-support, logistical and engineering services, and proved itself highly successful considering the complexity and magnitude.

<b>Base Camp Maintenance</b>	<b>Environmental Support</b>
<b>Basic Life Support</b>	<b>U.S. Mail Delivery</b>
<b>Food Services</b>	<b>Excess Property/Scrap</b>
<b>Laundry</b>	<b>Vector Control</b>
<b>Transportation</b>	<b>MSR Maintenance</b>
<b>Container Handling</b>	<b>Snow and Ice Removal</b>
<b>Shuttle Bus</b>	<b>Construction</b>
<b>Equipment Maintenance</b>	<b>Supply Operations</b>
<b>Water Production</b>	<b>Fuel Operations</b>
<b>Management and Administration</b>	<b>Sewage and Waste Removal</b>

TABLE 1 - LOGCAP CONTRACT SCOPE

The contract was planned in phases and initially provided documentation and data identifying anticipated shortfalls in equipment and material within the selected study sites. The results served as estimates as force structure changes progressed. The contract tasks were executed when the Commander in Chief (CINC) of a Contingency operation, either a Joint Task Force (JTF) or theater commander, requested support from the USACE Procuring Contracting Officer (PCO). If a contingency or crisis developed which required LOGCAP support, the commander would formally identify LOGCAP requirements via a Statement of Work (SOW) as a contract line item number to the existing USACE Support Contract. The contractor would then provide a Rough Order of Magnitude (ROM) cost estimate to perform the requirements in the SOW. USACE then executed the in-theater program, and contract management was performed through the Logistics Support Element (LSE) commander and his staff. The LSE commander served as the focal point to the customer for LOGCAP planning and execution in-theater. He exercised coordinating authority and oversight through "Team LOGCAP,"<sup>5</sup> a role later assumed by the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) as the contract administrator.

As the Cold War ended and infrastructure was reduced, it became apparent that contractors were needed more than ever to support the Army's logistical shortfalls, particularly for contingency operations and maintenance of its high tech weapons systems. Additionally, the Bottom-Up Review resulted in the requirement to support two Major Regional Conflicts (MRCs) with an increasingly smaller force. To facilitate this, the Army would have to utilize LOGCAP to provide vital services to our soldiers and fulfill support requirements for increasingly complex and unconventional missions. With increasing worldwide deployments to peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and humanitarian operations, Army leadership was

again challenged to determine how much, when, and where to employ and deploy defense contractors on the battlefield. Additionally, there was also the issue of who would provide oversight of the contractor.

Although the methodology of contingency contracting had previously proven successful and effective, it was very costly in terms of dollars and risks associated with civilian contractor personnel serving in combat zones. The basic LOGCAP contract was funded by USACE. In the event of a contingency, the Army Major Command (MACOM) who was responsible for the crisis would be required to fund the contractor's activities in theater. The Department of the Army (DA) provided fiscal year 1992 operation and management funds to USACE for the LOGCAP program. However, any exercise of the contingency options was dependent on unidentified MACOM/DA funding.

<b>Estimated Year</b>	<b>Contingency</b>	<b>Basic</b>	<b>Total Costs</b>
1992-1993	\$0	\$4,750,000	\$ 4,750,000
1994-1994	\$0	\$4,750,000	\$ 4,750,000
1994-1995	\$0	\$4,500,000	\$ 4,500,000
1995-1996	\$0	\$2,750,000	\$ 2,750,000
1996-1997	\$0	\$3,000,000	\$ 3,000,000
<b>Total Contract Estimated Cost<sup>6</sup></b>			<b>\$19,750,000</b>

TABLE 2 - LOGCAP COST ESTIMATES

<b>Location</b>	<b>ACTIVITY</b>	<b>YEAR</b>	<b>Total Cost</b>
Somalia	Base Support	1992	\$106,000,000
Rwanda	Base Support	1994	\$ 6,500,000
Saudi Arabia	Base Support	1994	\$ 5,000,000
Haiti	Base Support	1994	\$ 149,000,000
Aviano	Base Support	1995	\$ 6,300,000
Bosnia-Herzegovina	Base Support	1995-98	\$950,000,000
*Includes basic and follow-on contract to same contractor. <sup>7</sup>			

TABLE 3 - LOGCAP EVENT HISTORY

Understanding the past history of contracted support and the magnitude of the LOGCAP program is essential for future commanders who will consider affordability, flexibility, and force protection in future decisionmaking. Additionally, the role of DCMA as a combat support organization for providing control, direction, and management of contractors on future battlefields must be clearly understood as well. There are many challenges and issues with civilians accompanying military forces in the field that

deserve examination along with some implications and recommendations for improving this type of support to the warfighter.

## HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION SERVICES

This study examines the role that DCMA plays in the broad area of acquisition management. The DCMA procurement mission of providing contract administration services evolved from a Department of Defense (DoD) study called Project 60 that was established in 1962. The study analyzed the management of defense contracts with the possibility of establishing uniform technical functions for "greater efficiency and economy."<sup>8</sup> Following this effort and a nationwide test, the Defense Contract Administration Services (DCAS) organization was formed in 1964 under the Defense Supply Agency (DSA), later Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), to consolidate contract management activities. Subsequently, Defense Contract Administration Services Regions (DCASRs) were activated and subdivided into DCAS Management Areas (DCASMAs), DCAS Plant Representative Offices (DCASPROs), and DCAS Districts (DCASDs) to administer government contracts. The objective of the DCAS region was "to have one DOD spokesman at the plant level to provide better and more responsive services"<sup>9</sup> for contract administration, production surveillance, inspection and acceptance of materiel, accountability of government property, security clearance of contractor facilities and personnel, and contractor payments.

As a result of the Defense Management Report (DMR) in 1989 and Defense Management Review Decision 916, contract administration functions within DLA and those still remaining in the services were again consolidated and reorganized under the Defense Contract Management Command (DCMC) in 1990. This transfer of these functions precipitated several name changes where DCASRs were renamed Defense Contract Management Regions (DCMRs), DCASMAs became Defense Contract Management Area Operations (DCMAOs), and DCASPROs were renamed Defense Plant Representative Offices (DPROs). Selected regions were also redesignated as Defense Contract Management Districts, immediately subordinate to DCMC, while small offices below the DPRO level were established as Defense Contract Management Offices (DCMOs).

Throughout the 1990s, DCMC continued to reorganize under the Base Realignment and Closure process (BRAC) and also acquired the mission to provide Contingency Contracting Administration Services (CCAS) to support military contingencies, humanitarian assistance operations, and disaster relief efforts worldwide. This involved the deployment of teams in the field to ensure that the contractor provided the services required. Eventually, the command gained distinction as the provider of "world class contract management services,"<sup>10</sup> with a commitment to customer satisfaction as its top priority. As a successful leader for Acquisition Reform (AR) and many other accomplishments over the past 10 years, the Deputy Secretary of Defense redesignated DCMC and established it as the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) effective March 27, 2000, reporting directly to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)).

Today its contingency contracting role has expanded with the increased deployment of military forces in response to Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) and Operations Other Than War (OOTW). Simply

defined, contingency contracting is the process of provisioning essential supplies and services needed to sustain a mission.

"Contracting for supplies and services by the U. S. military during times of crisis is not new. The practice has a long history dating back to the Revolutionary War. The military's use of civilian contractors in various operations and theaters has steadily expanded during all subsequent conflicts. Operations in support of the Vietnam War particularly highlighted the need for civilian contractor capabilities to augment combat support and combat service support forces. However, it wasn't until nearly a decade after Vietnam that the concept for preplanning for civilian contractor support in a wartime theater began to take shape."<sup>11</sup>

Future contracted logistics support would now be known as LOGCAP. However, in order to provide responsive support to deployed forces it became necessary to delegate administration of the LOGCAP contract to DCMA for technical management and execution of contractual requirements. The contract administration mission evolved with structured CCAS team deployments as DCMA assumed greater responsibilities. This resulted in less work for the USACE program office in the U.S. and more administrative effort in the field by the CCAS team.

As for contract execution, the CCAS process provided an accountable mechanism for deployed units to expedite services with tailored support in a timely manner. Significant administrative effort for this contract was expended under the Bosnia-Herzegovina task order due to the new stabilization mission and resources allocated. Examples of administrative support included contract modifications, the authorization of construction and engineering services, and quality assurance for compliance with contract specifications. Contract administration services also included management of the award fee process that provided an incentive to the contractor for good performance. This involved setting aside a portion of the contract dollars into an award fee pool. Every six months the U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR), the COE PCO, the DCMA ACO, Task Force officials and customer representatives reviewed the contractor's performance to determine what percentage of the incentive fee should be awarded. Most of the award fees recommended since 1995 have ranged between 95 - 100%. Today, BRSC continues as the prime contractor for logistical support and engineering services in the Balkans, with DCMA providing direction for the \$498 million Operation Joint Forge sustainment contract. Unequivocally, DCMA possesses the requisite expertise and experience utilizing highly skilled teams of trained professionals in the areas of Quality Assurance, Property, Contract Administration, and Cost/Pricing to meet the needs of future contingency contracting missions.

#### **CURRENT DEFENSE CONTRACT MANAGEMENT AGENCY STRATEGY**

An examination of the roles and missions of DCMA CCAS management requires an understanding of its magnitude and complexity. The DCMA mission is to provide customer-focused contract management services throughout the acquisition life cycle, "around the clock, around the world."<sup>12</sup> The command strategy centers around DCMA people teaming to provide world class contract management services – now and into the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The command is committed to three strategic goals that are to

"deliver great customer service, lead the way to efficient and effective business processes, and enable DCMA people to excel."<sup>13</sup>

DCMA is integral to the life cycle management functions within the acquisition process from pre-award through contract closeout. Through contract administration, DCMA provides oversight of government contracts to ensure product, cost, and schedule compliance for supplies and services needed by our warfighters. These business functions serve as the focal point for acquisition reform initiatives and efforts, to leverage resources and ensure that services and products meet the needs of customers. Everyday DCMA personnel perform cost/price analysis, quality assurance of contractor processes, program and technical support, final inspection and acceptance of critical items, and contract administration, which includes modifications, property accountability, and more than 40 other management functions outlined in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), with the highest degree of integrity and professionalism.

DCMA capabilities extend beyond the corporate factories and manufacturing plants of industry. DCMA professionals also deploy and serve on the frontlines alongside American forces in contingency operations worldwide, adding another dimension to their broad range of responsibilities. Since the formation of DCMC in 1990, contracting professionals have participated in a number of military operations, including Kosovo, Bosnia, Haiti, Rwanda, Somalia, and Kuwait as well as providing support for domestic disasters. In the broadest sense, contingency contracting is an essential combat support function performed by DCMA's talented, diverse workforce to sustain readiness during mobilization, deployments and military operations. The urgency and scope of CCAS operations requires meticulous planning and responsive management to ensure successful support to the warfighter. Effective CCAS support demands selfless leadership and a disciplined organization to assure a high level of customer satisfaction now and into the future. Bottomline, DCMA core capabilities are linked to battlefield sustainment and real world contingencies with the same degree of efficiency and effectiveness as weapon systems acquisition.

## **ASSESSING CONTINGENCY CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION SERVICES**

Since 1995, DCMA professionals have supported multinational peacekeeping efforts for Operations Joint Endeavor, Joint Forge, and Joint Guard in the Balkans. This CCAS mission entailed the establishment of base camps and BRSC operations in Bosnia, Croatia, and Hungary to provide daily services such as dining facility operations, material handling, transportation, maintenance, laundry, mail, water, construction and engineering support. Partnering and teamwork were essential to the success of the BRSC supporting the warfighter in this hostile environment. Currently, there are many that do not understand the contractor's role to augment the force structure and provide sustainment. Some perceive the contractor as strictly a profit-motivated entity. So DCMA has ensured through its administrative oversight that the contractor is an integral part of the requirements process and support plans for providing the very best quality services available to take care of the soldier. However, leaders and soldiers need to become more knowledgeable about this capability for future warfare and learn to trust

the system the government has acquired to assure their success. My personal experience in the Balkans reveals the following issues and lessons learned where improvement is needed:

- Accessibility to senior leaders and commanders in theater by DCMA and contractor personnel
- CAPSTONE training/customer education on LOGCAP contract and government responsibilities
- Integration of DCMA and contractor personnel into exercises, CONPLANS, and OPLANS
- Approval of Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA) for contractors
- Improved procedures for reimbursable support of multinational operations
- Improved accountability and utilization of government furnished property and equipment
- Utilization of Independent Government Cost Estimates (IGCE)
- Early identification and training of Contracting Officer Representative (CORs)
- Full dimensional security and force protection for contractor personnel
- Management and control of multiple contractors on the battlefield
- Redefining the status of contractors and civilians accompanying military forces in the field

Contractors have always been relied on from the American Revolution through our operations in East Timor today. They bring unique and cost effective solutions to support national and strategic objectives. Indeed, contractor support is an alternative for DoD to maximize the capabilities and footprint of the fighting forces in this austere budgetary environment. Contingency contractors are extremely cost effective in terms of peacetime operations and can sometimes mobilize quicker than the military forces they must support.

We are also witnessing an increased dependence on contractor logistics support for systems and services, both on and off the battlefield. Studies and research indicate that civilian personnel can accomplish the support missions contracted. They need not be military. However, issues continue to be examined regarding the balance between the cost and necessity to maintain support functions with military capability rather than a contractor. The ideal future battlefield would be devoid of contractor personnel as non-combatants, but warfighting commanders have many critical continuing needs (to include base camp services, host nation procurement, and weapons system support) that require contractors to satisfy their mission requirements. The military must maintain some capability to accomplish field level maintenance of its weapon systems on a hostile battlefield or high-threat environment, but systems have been designed which do not allow this. Additionally, there are a number of low-density military occupational specialties that are lacking in the force, and are better suited for civilian contracting. Contractor augmentation is key today because "less than 25 percent of the Combat Support/ Combat Service Support (CS/CSS) force structure is part of the active component, with the remaining percentage in the National Guard or Reserve Forces."<sup>14</sup>

But as we move more and more toward commercial, off-the-shelf technology, contractor logistics support will become more practical. Therefore, we must accommodate this trend in our deployment planning and execution. Likewise, with troop strength reductions, we have to offset the smaller, logistical

footprint with contracted services as an effective force multiplier, not a force replacement. This is particularly advantageous since contractor support is not counted against troop numbers in theater.

Although there are many benefits to utilizing contractors, there are also problems in executing operations that do not include them in our plans. A recurring political issue to be considered in contingency operations is the use of reserve and National Guard forces. Active duty units have been downsizing since 1989, and many combat support/service support missions have been transferred to Reserve and National Guard units. Activating the reserves risks oversight and disapproval and is sometimes a concern for employers and deployed individuals, who may not have a job when they return from their deployment mission. Thus, personal and political ramifications of activating these personnel for a contingency, along with timing, may cause the National Command Authorities to utilize reserve forces only when absolutely necessary.

On another note, we also cannot depend totally upon host nation support with any high degree of reliability because of changing conditions and circumstances in various nation-states. Therefore, contracted support can be a viable alternative for augmenting the force as well as an effective force multiplier for military operations.

However, one problem that must be resolved is a commander's understanding of the contract scope and the role of DCMA. The contractor and DCMA are sometimes excluded in the planning and daily Battle Update Briefings (BUB), yet they are still expected to provide support without having had input. Thus the rationale for DCMA to increase visibility and to project its value-added to the warfighter.

### **CHALLENGES, ISSUES, AND RISKS**

Contracted support during the Gulf War consisted primarily of military personnel awarding and administering contracts under Host Nation Support Agreements (HNSA). HNSAs are agreements between the U.S. and the nation in which our troops are deployed. These agreements govern the methods and restrictions under which U.S. forces may procure goods and services. LTG William G. Pagonis, Army Central Command (ARCENT) Deputy Commanding General for Logistics, was primarily responsible for providing base support logistics. ARCENT personnel were responsible for "fuel, water, food, vehicles, ammunition, all classes of supply (except equipment repair spare parts) for the Marines, Air Force, and the Army."<sup>15</sup>

One of the most important contributions to the success of Gulf War logistics was the designation of LTG Pagonis as "single logistics leader."<sup>16</sup> This military operations model can be adapted to the contracting environment as well. When considering the options of HNSA and LOGCAP, "one contractor with several thousand employees is easier to manage than a hundred small contractors with a few employees each."<sup>17</sup> Either way, there are challenges, issues, and risks whether there is a single contractor performing multiple functions or multiple contractors each performing separate tasks.

While military personnel provided some aspects of support, contracted services were critical to the Gulf War success.

"From the moment American forces first arrived in Saudi Arabia during Operation Desert Shield/Storm, their survival was dependent on contracted support. Their first bottle of water, transportation to their base camp, tents (as shelter) from the harsh environment, refuse control for garbage, ice to preserve rations, showers and latrines were all provided through contracted support."<sup>18</sup>

The question for future warfare should be "who is on the battlefield?" Accountability of personnel and security are two very important reasons for identifying who is on the battlefield. Currently, there is not a single organization chartered to manage and control all of the contractors on the battlefield (e.g. Operation Joint Forge). But a centrally managed database, administered by DCMA, could facilitate the tracking of contractors in the AOR, the scope of their effort, the Government's responsibilities to these contractors, key points of contact, validation of their legal status, and in general provide some theater visibility to the CINC/commander.

Why assume this overarching contractor responsibility? Based on recent lessons learned and the lack of current theater doctrine, a systematic approach for management and control of contractors on the battlefield is needed. Considering the level of risk associated with combat zones, force protection, movement and control, the hiring of local nationals, and some sensitive requirements, there may be instances when administrative issues, priorities, or general concerns for the well being of all contractor personnel need to be addressed from a single perspective. Additionally, administrative oversight could serve as a cross-link for coordinating mutual interests, pooling efforts for multinational requirements, and communicating risk factors when threat levels change within the AOR, consequently impacting another contractor's operation. However, the security and safety of all personnel should be foremost among the many difficult decisions already confronting the battlefield commander as the battlefield evolves.

It should be noted that contractors provide valuable goods or services and manage them to the extent the applicable contract delineates. The government or DCMA on behalf of a Procuring Contracting Officer (PCO) can direct the contractor to perform services or deliver the goods but no one commands them. Establishing command and control over contractors directly contradicts the current initiatives under Acquisition Reform and would probably fall outside the contract scope. The government must be very meticulous in designing management controls and proprietary measures for contractors on the battlefield, especially when there are opportunities for mutual support and shared data. Again, another argument for DCMA experts as the contract administrator of choice on future battlefields.

A single command or focal point for contractors in response to the needs of our CINCs does have some merit. Indeed, the current proliferation of contracting offices and contractors on the battlefield are a direct result, in part, of the lack of theater contracting doctrine to address the needs of our warfighting commanders. Does placing this responsibility in a single command such as DCMA result in better support on the battlefield? It certainly would provide more centralized control without impeding the quality of support. It would be of tremendous value to have a single point or some other central function (as

described), that could at least provide visibility for the CINC/commander regarding contractors on the battlefield. The centralized process for the comprehensive review, approval, and subsequent management of all phases of contractor logistics support is difficult to conceive even in theory; but a function or process to provide oversight (and maybe guidance) is plausible and sorely needed. Contractors will continue to be on the battlefield of the future and will require some level of protection both in combat situations and under the Geneva Convention.

The necessity of close relations between the support commands, the customer, and the contractor is absolutely essential. Utilizing DCMA ensures prioritization of contractor support and representation for interfacing with customer units, particularly when threat levels rise. Let me also postulate that the very existence of contractors as a prime means of support to military operations may have a sobering impact on the decision process to commit forces in the first place. If military operations are not worthy of the potential sacrifice of civilian contractor personnel, they are probably not worthy of the sacrifice of our soldiers, sailors, airmen or marines.

#### **NEED FOR JOINT DOCTRINE AND TRAINING**

DCMA is normally delegated the responsibility of managing contract administration and providing seamless support on the battlefield. It is my contention that the future battlefield and most contingencies will be responded to by a joint task force. Therefore, it would be advantageous for DCMA to invest time in assisting with the development of joint theatre doctrine in planning for contractors to accompany the force along with the integration of CCAS into the joint planning process. There is a need to initiate organizational and operational changes that address future warfare in accordance with Joint Vision 2010 (JV2010).

JV2010 provides "common direction for the services, combatant commands, and defense agencies"<sup>19</sup> to meet future challenges. The concept of Focused Logistics calls for "tailored logistics packages and sustainment directly at the strategic, operational, and tactical level of operations."<sup>20</sup> The time is right to focus DCMA CCAS on joint training and theater support to better leverage core capabilities for achieving future capabilities. JV2010 permeates the entire defense community and affords DCMA the opportunity to assess and redefine CCAS for future joint warfighting concepts and operations. With the emerging roles of the U.S. Joint Forces Command, DCMA can better link its core competencies to this joint provider by expanding the CCAS mission and responsibilities through integrated training and liaison relationships with the CINCs. Planning for CCAS integration and employment will improve joint operational effectiveness, posture the agency for increased preparedness, and develop greater teamwork. DCMA associates and contractor personnel are an integral part of our total force package, like the National Guard and Reserve Forces, who make up the joint warfighting capability and provide value added service to task force components.

## **IMPLICATIONS OF NEW DOCTRINE**

Doctrine serves as the denominator to link strategy and force structure for the conduct and execution of military operations. The multidimensional logistical operations orchestrated by LTG Pagonis during Operation Desert Storm provide a sound basis for improving future combat service support. Key to his success was the importance of strategic mobility. The integration of airlift, sealift and prepositioned equipment ensured that our National Command Authorities had viable deployment plans for executing the Gulf War strategy. "Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm (ODS) represent the largest logistics operation our Army has conducted since the Vietnam War. Strategic mobility, modernization, equipment readiness, host nation support, security assistance, industrial preparedness, and training were key aspects of the logistics mission which proved critical to our overwhelming victory."<sup>21</sup> Getting contracted logistics support to the right place, at the right time and with the right efficiency in an overwhelmingly complex environment requires planning, coordination, and integration.

The increasing reliance upon contractor support, strategic transportation, and voluminous shipments of equipment and supplies requires us to look at new concepts for improving CCAS for joint warfighting in the 21st century. From a strategic perspective, DCMA must continue to ensure that services needed by the joint forces and requirements for contingency operations are responded to more rapidly and efficiently. Information superiority will certainly be key in administering the right capabilities at the right time and right place for mission performance.

Gulf War logistics demonstrated how host nation support and multiple contracting efforts were synchronized to facilitate the awesome task of expeditiously discharging ships and aircraft. The magnitude of this effort produced enormous quantities containing in excess of 12,000 track vehicles; 114,000 wheel vehicles; 1800 Army aircraft; 33,000 containers; 1,800,000 short tons of cargo; 273,000 short tons of ammunition; and more than 350,000 personnel. Practically everything to include food, fuel, ammunition, repair parts, medical supplies, transportation, and communications equipment had to be pushed forward. Equally as important was the timing and deployment of the logistics force structure into the theater. The establishment of 13 major subordinate commands, ten separate companies/detachments, and oversight for 31,679 personnel to support nine logistical bases for sustainment of our warfighters was meticulously orchestrated. Today, on a smaller scale, we successfully execute the same functions of Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (RSOI) along with sustainment and engineering support utilizing a single contractor, CCAS teams, and a few well trained, motivated soldiers who share in the vision and success of Operation Joint Forge. The challenge for tomorrow is to build upon the past successes and lessons learned to focus on new strategies for power projection of forces in future operations.

Three areas need to be addressed for improving contracted support on the battlefield. First, the management of local contracting efforts and contract administration within a combat zone or on the battlefield should be centralized to provide unity of effort, a single focal point to the CINC/commander for procurement matters, and risk reduction considering force protection measures. Secondly, an analysis

should be done to review the history of contracted support so that logistics planners can optimize the appropriate mix and level of military effort for future operations. Thirdly, joint doctrine must be developed concerning the management of multiple contractors and the status of civilians accompanying the force for contingencies and joint operations. The increasing number of contractors and contracting activities involved in providing support on the battlefield deserves immediate attention to achieve the proper balance and capability. Although some service-unique functions and weapons systems will require dedicated contractor support, common logistical and life support services from multiple sources should be reviewed for consolidation and administration by a single joint contracting agency such as DCMA. Whatever doctrine and organizational structure emerges from this effort must be centered on providing flexibility and responsiveness to the theater CINC/commander with streamlined management and control for deployed civilians.

### **STRATEGIC VISION FOR CCAS**

As we face the dynamics and challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, it is time to focus on a new direction for contract management. The future of contract administration is as good as the quality of the people providing the support. We must do all that is required to professionally develop our military and civilian associates for Future Contract Administration Services (FCAS). Since the future will be laced with Volatility, Uncertainty, Complexity, and Uncertainty (VUCA), DCMA must focus ahead by training for certainty and educating for uncertainty. The future is joint integration and interoperability to enhance our joint capabilities. This requires core competencies and new doctrine for joint contracting support within the theater and to accomplish this DCMA must exercise strategic flexibility. The economist John Maynard Keynes once said "ideas shape the course of history"<sup>22</sup> and our difficulty lies not in accepting new ones, but in escaping from the old ones; sometimes we have to do things not presently being done. We must embrace experimentation and study current contingency contracting issues and problems to influence Early Contract Administration Services (ECAS) relative to JV2010. DCMA must continue to refine the framework for leader development and team building so that future CCAS teams can shape support, respond quickly, and prepare for the full spectrum of operations. Our future contingency contracting mission can only be categorized as awesome in meeting the needs of JV2010.

Since DCMA has been designated as an agency, it should be appropriately staffed to support its defined combat support mission. The addition of a Deputy Commanding General (DCG) billet with CCAS oversight for theater support would greatly enhance DCMA's mission of delivering great customer service. This position would allow a General/Flag officer to serve as the single focal point for complex issues involving contractors on the battlefield, host nation support, and CCAS for multinational operations. Specifically, the DCG could advise CINCs/JTF/theater commanders and the Joint Staff on joint contracting matters, and facilitate CAS for interagency groups participating in contingency operations. DCMA's strategic vision should include on-going efforts and new direction to improve current procedures and/or pursue the following concepts:

- Telecontracting for split-based CCAS operations
- Participating in campaign planning
- Programming and integrating annual CCAS training with the Joint Forces Command
- Active involvement in wargaming exercises, simulations, and experimentation
- Development of standardized deployment unit guidance and training procedures
- Development of policies relative to civilians accompanying the force
- Development of joint doctrine for theater contract management
- Proponency for Joint Contract Administration Services (JCAS)
- Proponency for Interagency Contract Administration Services (ICAS)
- Conducting interagency workshops for procurement support of multinational operations with organizations like the United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Department of State (DOS), the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS), and Service Contracting Directors

While not all inclusive, these examples demonstrate concepts that can be implemented to better serve the combatant commander's efforts and ensure the value and viability of contract management into the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

## **SUMMARY**

The political and economic realities of the DoD budget have forced the Services to pursue new alternatives such as outsourcing to private industry. Prior to Desert Storm we operated from fixed bases with the infrastructure and capacity to handle our forces. This is not our present reality. In fact, we currently deploy to austere bases and operate from them sometimes utilizing the infrastructure budget from our stateside and overseas installations as support. Therefore, our resources are stretched very thinly, particularly human assets, and as we engage in new contingencies around the world, our military resources continue to diminish. This is why the concept of augmenting military force structure with civilian contractors is acceptable, adequate, and feasible.

The Army has used contracted support during combat before and should continue to institutionalize comprehensive support contracts as envisioned in the LOGCAP program. There is much to be gained from operations in the Balkans and every attempt should be made to capture these learned experiences into our historical files. Future support of multinational operations requires a review of history and the integration of contracting support into Contingency Plans (CONPLANS) and Operational Plans (PLANS). A concerted effort is needed by DCMA and the Joint Staff to develop joint doctrine for the governance of contingency contracting at the theater level. This is a 21<sup>st</sup> century contract management initiative that must be undertaken if DCMA is to maintain relevancy with JV2010 and ongoing changes centered on the Joint Forces Command (JFCOM). Integrating training with JFCOM will only enhance the effectiveness of

CCAS teams through situational awareness and orientations that will better prepare team members for meeting future challenges.

DCMA taking the lead to provide a new level of contract management and administration will be critical to delivering flexible support to the warfighter's future joint environment. Timely, responsive support must prevail on our future battlefields through focused leadership, strategic planning, and the expansion of services. We must continue creating new visions that serve to balance existing resources while promoting efficiencies to increase the confidence of support to the warfighter from the only provider of world class contract administration.

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## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> Department of the Army, Contractors on the Battlefield, Field Manual 100-21 Final Draft (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, September 1999), 1-10.

<sup>2</sup> David R. Palmer, Summons of the Trumpet (New York: Ballantine Books, 1978), 113.

<sup>3</sup> U.S. Army, Corps of Engineers, Transatlantic Programs Division, Acquisition Plan for Logistics Civil Augmentation Program Phase I. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1992), 2.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> U.S. Army, Combined Arms Support Command, LOGCAP Handout. (Ft. Lee, 1995), 4.

<sup>6</sup> U.S. Army, Corps of Engineers, Transatlantic Programs Division, Acquisition Plan for Logistics Civil Augmentation Program Phase I. (Winchester: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1992), 5.

<sup>7</sup> Vernon Knight, "Briefing to Defense Contract Management Agency Contingency Planners," Logistics Civil Augmentation Program. (Boston, October 14, 1998), 3-10.

<sup>8</sup> US Air Force Institute of Technology, Air University, Course 6606, Contract Administration, Volume 1, The Environment of the Administrative Contracting Officer, (Gunter AFB, 1969-70), 6.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Defense Logistics Agency, "DCMC Vision," Dimensions, The DLA Vision, (Ft. Belvoir, 1999 Almanac), 28.

<sup>11</sup> LTC Nicholas J. Kolar, Jr., U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, "LOGCAP: Providing Vital Services to Soldiers," Engineer Professional Bulletin, (March, 1997)

<sup>12</sup> Defense Logistics Agency, "DCMC Vision," Dimensions, The DLA Vision, (Ft. Belvoir, 1999 Almanac), 28.

<sup>13</sup> Defense Contract Management Agency, "Performance Plan," Business Plan and Goals for Fiscal Year 2000, (Ft. Belvoir, 1999)

<sup>14</sup> David W. Russell, Understanding the Application of the Army's Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP). Research Project presented to U. S. Army War College, (Carlisle Barracks, 1997), 19.

<sup>15</sup> William G. Pagonis, Moving Mountains: Lessons in Leadership and the Gulf War. (Boston: Harvard University Press, 1992), 97.

<sup>16</sup> Major Todd E. Behne et al., Gulf War Logistics: Theory into Practice, Research Project presented to Air Command and Staff College, (Maxwell AFB, 1995), 13.

<sup>17</sup> D.L. Young, Operational Planning for Contractors on the Battlefield, Research Project presented to the Naval War College, (Newport, 1998), 14.

<sup>18</sup> R.L. Wells, "Contracting Readiness: Timely Support for Military Operations." Acquisition Review Quarterly, (Ft. Belvoir: Defense Acquisition University), 42.

<sup>19</sup> The Joint Staff, "Concept for Future Joint Operations", Expanding Joint Vision 2010, (Ft. Monroe: Joint Warfighting Center, 1997), 2.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., 54.

<sup>21</sup> Department of the Army, "Logistics Posture of the Army", Army Logistian, (Washington, D.C.: Army Materiel Command, July-August 1992, 16.

<sup>22</sup> Dr. Laurence J. Peter, "Ideas for our time," John Maynard Keynes, Peter's Quotations, (New York: Morrow, 1977), 259.

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